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Introduction 
As Malta is bracing herself up for the membership of the European 
Community it seems timely to reflect upon the effects of the membership on 
the national legal systems. Politicians and economists face a challenge of this 
new venture in their own fields but lawyers, apart from the challenge, have 
to prepare themselves for a mighty shock to the national system. The waves 
of this shock will reverberate throughout the whole system for membership 
means more than a new political alignment or adjustments of economic policy 
or trade rules. 
It is so because the EC is a '' new legal order in International Law 
embracing not only the member states but also their citizens" (Case 26 / 62: 
Van Gcnd v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECR 1 at 29). 
It has been established by law and it is governed by law, hence the tendency 
towards a legalistic bureaucracy in the management of its affairs. 
Behind the political ideal of a European Union, still on the far horizon, 
lies the hard economic reality because political integration is to be achieved 
through economic integration. The law plays a \·ital role in this process since 
it is used as the instrument of defining economic policies and the machinery 
for their enforcement. Thus legal integration forms a part of this process. 
Although set on a federal course the Community is still searching for its 
constitution and no-one can be sure what form will this unprecedented political 
animal take. Probably it will be like a camel - a strange-looking creature -
as if it had been designed by a committee of politicians rather than the Almighty, 
though to insist on that might suggest that God has no sense of humour. He 
has, but his absence marks the debates about the future of the Community 
in ,ls much as some have said, in the Catholic Church, that the Holy Spirit 
forgot to attend Vatican II. 
The controversy about the future of the Community reflects two broad 
questions, i.e. whether the Community should be a Community of peoples 
disregarding national boundaries and state so,·ereignties or the Community 
of sm-ereign states acting in harmony for the good of the European Continent 
from the straits of Gibraltar to the Urals. The other aspect of the controversy 
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reflects the methods to be applied in order to achieve the desired effect. Here 
we can see a sharp conflict between the evolutionary-pragmatic approach 
favoured mainly by Britain and Denmark and a doctrinaire-formalistic approach 
championed at present mainly by France and Italy. Assuming that both wish 
the same, i.e. a united Europe, the difference seems more in the means and 
the timing of the action than in the ultimate· objective. Both reflect different 
historical experiences and different constitutional methods. The British 
approach, insisting on a gradual development moving step by step in accordance 
with the programme laid down in the Treaties, lacks the drama and the rhetoric 
of the Latin races but can claim a realistic stance since the politics is the art 
of the possible. Therefore it insists on the completion of the internal market, 
now set for the end of 1992, and the development of a common foreign policy 
alongside the defence rather than embarking on a written constitution devised 
by University professors. Recent ev.ents have, at least partially, vindicated this 
approach. Countries which advocate a high speed of the political integration 
tend to lag behind when it comes to the implementation of their duties. Indeed 
the record of enforcement actions taken against these countries before the 
Community Court belies their "pro-European" commitment. Events in Eastern 
Europe have changed the rules of the game. There seem to be no longer two 
hostile blocs facing each other menacingly but a new opportunity to work 
together and to turn, as it were, swords into ploughshares. NATO too will 
have to change and adopt a new role. All this requires consolidation of the 
EC in face of the need of a massive economic aid to foster the revival of 
democracy in Eastern Europe. 
The rape of Kuwait and the Middle East crisis, echoing the pre-1939 
anxieties, has exposed the weakness of the EC as a collective would-be world 
power. Some countries, like for example Britain, vigorously responded to the
challenge but others were slow in showing an effective supp
.
ort for the United 
Nations' resolutions condemning Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and ordering 
sanctions. The Community collective response was feeble as it was limited to 
a vocal condemnation of Iraq. Under the presidency of Italy it exposed itself 
as a muscular but headless body, thus proving that it is, at present, an economic 
giant but a political dwarf. 
It is clear that, in order to fulfil its historical purpose of uniting the 
Continent the Community must maintain a c:lynamic momentum. However 
it is a chicken and egg dilemma whether the Community should adopt out 
of the blue, as it were, a federal constitution signailing the demise of the 
sovereign state or build upon the existing institutions and, by rnforming itself, 
gradually find, by experience, the most appropriate form of government. It 
seems that the latter is the right way. Therefore I do not expect any dramatic 
results from the Intergovernmental Conference to be held in December in Rome 
under the Italian presidency, though some improvement in the cumbersome 
decision-making process, a better co-operation in economic and monetary policy 
and the much needed implementation of the Treaty provisions on the political 
co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy (E.P.C.) may emerge. Besides, 
there is still the unfinished business of the internal market which raises a delicate 
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question of improving the machinery for the enforcement of the member states' 
obligations. 
However, whatever the prognostications, we are witnessing an exciting 
and positive development of the old Continent though it is confined at present 
to twelve countries only with the danger that the Community may become a 
cosy, selfish and self-centered club. What should the outsiders do? I think they 
should join, for the future of the Community is their future too and the future 
of the whole Continent. The price of joining is, as we shall see, a substantial 
surrender of their sovereignty in exchange for active participation in the 
decision-making process. Apart from the economic benefits of the enlarged 
internal market few countries can expect direct financial benefits for somebody 
has to pay for the common policies and, in this world, there are very few cheerful 
givers. 
The process of admitting new members is a formal one. After the 
application to the Council of Ministers and a positive opinion of the Commission 
the Council decides by a unanimous vote after receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament acting by an absolute majority. There is no automatic 
admission even for countries which have enjoyed the status of association (See 
Commission op_inion on the admission of Turkey, December 1989) like for 
example Malta since 1971. According to the Treaties (EEC Art.237, amended 
by Single European Act, Art.8, Euratom Art.205; ECSE Art.98) the only 
qualification required is that the applicant is a ''European'' country but in 
practice, further unwritten conditions have been applied, namely that the 
applicant is a parliamentary democracy and is willing and able to carry out 
the obligations arising from the membership. Still further qualifications from 
the unsuccessful application of Turkey have emerged, i.e. that the applicant's 
economy has been aligned to that of the Community, that it has a good record 
of human rights and no quarrels with the existing members. 
Malta eminently fulfils the condition but admission like the application 
is a political decision and here you never know who your real friends are. One 
of the problems Turkey had to face were the competing interests of the 
Mediterranean countries which do enjoy a substantial support of the 
Community. Let us hope that no such problem will arise in the case of Malta 
and that the decision will be taken on merit. Let us turn now to the effects 
of accession to the Community. 
Community Solidarity and State Duties 
The Treaty of Accession and the Act of Accession which, in legal terms, 
embody the results of the negotiations for membership are sui generis 
international instruments. They bind the acceding state, the Community and 
the existing member states into a collectivity which is set on a course of 
development towards a federal system. The process seems irreversible since 
the founding Treaties (with the exception of the Treaty setting up the Coal and 
Steel Community) have been concluded for "an unlimited period" and there 
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is no provision for withdrawal or expulsion. It is assumed, therefore, that 
members shall work together in harmony to carry out the objectives of the 
founding Treaties and strive for the ideal of the European unity. This is implied 
in the "solidarity" clauses of the Treaties (EEC art 5; Eura tom art 192; Coal 
and Steel art 86) whereby the member states undertake to take all appropriate 
measures to fulfil the obligations arising from the Treaties and to refrain from 
any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of these objectives. 
Next to solidarity the Treaties (EEC art 7; Euratom arts 96 and 97; Coal 
and Steel art.69) impose upon the member state a general duty of non­
discrimination on the ground of nationality which affects not only relations 
between them, especially as regards track and the protection of ratio and 
national interest but also the rights of individuals. Moreover, coupled with the 
social provisions of the Treaty, the principle of non-discrimination has been 
developed by the jurisprudence of the Community Court to the extent of 
censuring national laws which permit discrimination between men and women 
(See e.g. Cases 61 / 81: Commission v United Kingdom (1982) 3CMLR 284; 
Case 165 I 81: (1984) ICMLR 44 and Case 248 / 83: Commission v Germany 
(1986) 2CMLR 588; Case 163 / 82: Commission v Italy (1984) 3CMLR 169. 
The member states whose national laws discriminate between men and women 
in areas covered by the Treaties (e.g. employment and social security) have 
to adjust their legislation accordingly. 
The principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality applies 
to a1l persons in all situations covered by Community law. Therefore, for 
example, a British tourist attacked and injured in France could not be denied 
compensation under the French scheme which provided compensation for the 
victims of crime but limited it to French citizens only (Case 186 / 87: Govan 
,. Tresor Public (1990) 2CMLR 613. 
Membership of the Community entails a complex and extensive system 
of state duties which is essential to the legal concept of the Community. These 
duties are both general (e.g. solidarity) and non-discrimination and specific, 
laid down in detail in the Treaties and consequential legislation. Some are 
positive (e.g. to enact laws for consumer protection) others negative (e.g. to 
refrain from discriminatory taxation of goods imported from another member 
state). Certain duties are explicit, others are implied. Explicit duties are 
expressed in the form of a command (e.g. that customs duties are to be 
abolished) whilst implied duties can be inferred from the provisions of the 
Treaties which envisage a certain action ( e.g. adjustment of obligations arising 
from treaties with non-member countries) or control of the state apparatus in 
its executive, legislative and judicial functions in order to facilitate the execution 
of explicit duties. Thus the executive must adopt the administrative measures 
necessary to carry into effect the Community policies; the legislature must enact 
the laws necessary to be in line with Community policies and the courts must 
ensure not only the correct application of Community law but also the legal 
protection which individuals, whether the citizens of a member state or the 
nationals of another member state, derive from Community law. 
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There is also an implied duty of vigilance exemplified by the right of the 
member states to challenge the validity of acts of the Community institutions 
(whether legislative or administrative) even if they have been party to the act 
in question (e.g. a regulation made by the Council of Ministers). Such challenge 
can be taken on the grounds of lack of competence, misuse of powers, breach 
of Community law or of an essential procedural requirement. This enabled 
recently the United Kingdom to obtain annulment of two directives, one for 
the use of agricultural hormones in cattle fodder and another providing for 
minimum standards for the comfort of battery hens. In both cases the text of 
the directive differed from the version on which the vote was taken, the 
irregularities having been perpetrated in the secretariat of the Council (Case 
68 / 86: U.K. v Council re Agricultural hormones (1988) 2CMLR 543 and 
Case 131 / 86: UK v Council, re battery hens (1988) 2CMLR 364). 
The relations between the member states in areas covered by the Treaties 
are not governed by the classical rules of International law but by the Treaties 
establishing the three Communities which together form the Constitution of 
the European Community. Thus in the policital sphere the member states are 
committed to the European Political Co-operation which entails the co­
ordination of national policies relevant to the Community; they participate in 
the Community Institutions in accordance with the Treaty provisions and 
provide personnel for the Community civil service. In the economic sphere 
they undertake to co-ordinate their national economic policies within the Treaty 
framework and in accordance with the decisions of the Community institutions 
in which they participate. Even in the social sphere the member states assume 
certain duties, i.e. the general duty of non-discrimination and specific duties 
entailed in the freedom of movement of workers and self-employed persons 
coupled with the provision of social benefits for Community citizens as well 
as the protection of fundamental human rights regarded as one of the general 
principles of Community law. 
The member states assume, of course, financial responsibility for the cost 
of the running of the Community and its policies. Thus they have to contribute 
to the Community budget whose main source of revenue are the Community 
'' own resources'' consisting primarily of the common customs tariff duties and 
a proportion of the value added tax which is a system of internal taxation levied 
according to common rules. 
Enforcement of Member States' Duties 
The Community is founded on the rule of law applicable to the member 
states and their citizens alike. The member states have undertaken 
unconditionally and without reservation the obligation of submitting the 
differences arising from the interpretation and application of the Treaties to 
the jurisdiction of the Community Court (EEC art.219; Euratom art.193; Coal 
and Steel art.87). By expressly renouncing any other method of solving disputes 
between sovereign states tq.ey have submitted their conduct to the judicial 
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control of one of the Community institutions. This constitutes an authority 
far exceeding the rules hitherto recognized in classical International law (Case 
25 /59: Netherlands v High Authority (1960) ECR 355). 
Having submitted their differences to compulsory adjudication by the 
Community Court they have also delegated the power of enforcement to the 
Commission (EEC art.169; Euratom art.141; Coal and Steel art.BB) acting 
as the "guardian of the Treaties". The Commission acts either on its own 
initiative or upon hearing complaints from another member state or even from 
individuals. The Commission acts according to a set procedure first investigating 
the allegations and then trying to settle the matter directly with the state 
concerned. If it considers that the state is in breach of a duty it will deliver 
a reasoned opinion stating the charge and enjoining the state to comply. In 
the event of non-compliance it must institute enforcement proceedings bef9re 
the Community Court in which it acts as an accuser and prosecutor. These 
cases arise mostly from the failure of the member states to implement 
Community measures adequately or in time. 
It is also provided that a member state may sue arother directly (EEC 
art.170; Euratom art.142; Coal and Steel art.89) but the procedure seeks to 
avoid such a confrontation. Therefore the complaint must first be passed on 
to the Commission which will investigate the matter and will try to find a 
solution. If it falls to do so either the Commission or the complaining state 
may sue. I am aware of one case only in which a member state sued another 
one directly (Case 141 I 78: France v United Kingdom (1979) ECR 2923). 
The function of the Court in these cases is to declare the legal position 
and thus bring the erring state back on the path of legality. It is assumed that, 
motivated by the rule of law, the states will comply with the judgment. Should 
they fail to do so the Commission may bring another action this time for the 
declaration that the member state concerned has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaty (EEC art.171; Euratom art.143). Such cases are extremely 
rare. Should a state once more defy the judgement the judicial process would 
be exhausted, the ultimate solution being a political one. 
This is the Achilles heel of the enforcement system because there is no 
practical way of physical execution of the judgements. Two such examples 
spring to mind: the wine war between France and Italy in 1975 when France 
refused to admit Italian wine and the matter was settled by the Commiss10n 
providing a subsidy to the Italian wine producers for the conversion of their 
product into industrial spirit. The other is the "guerre de moutons" between 
France and the United Kingdom. Back in 1978 there was a judgement against 
France (Case 232 / 78: Commission v France (1979) ECR 2729 and 24, 97 / 80: 
Commission v France (1980) ECR 1319) ordering France to remove the 
obstacles to the importation of sheepmeat from the U .K., but France refused 
to comply and aid to French sheep farmers was granted. However the "war" 
continues and this summer especially violence by the protesting French farmers 
prevented the free movement of the product. In the common market based 
on the free movement of goods there is no excuse for that and the state bears 
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responsibility for the unlawful behaviour of its citizens. Unless direct diplomacy 
solves the problem a new case may be brought against France, which is 
regrettable because it exposes her hypocrisy. 
Delegation of Powers to Community Institutions 
The duties outlined above impinge upon virtually all aspects of power 
vested in sovereign states and limit the state's freedom of action traditionally 
associated with the pursuit of national interests. These interests have to be 
accommodated within Community interests pursued for the benefit of the 
collective by the Community institutions. 
The Treaties establishing the three Communities together with their 
amendments and the Accession Treaties fall into a ca�q ,ry of their own. They 
are self-executing treaties in so far as they take effec mtomatically without 
the necessity of being transformed into national law. They are not mere 
contracts between the parties but ''treaty-laws'' since they establish autonomous 
international bodies having their own institutions and their own law. They 
constitute a new legal order in International law embracing the member states 
and their citizens (See Case 26 I 62, Van Gend (1963) ECR 1). This reflects 
three legal orders interlocked like three intersecting circles: the International 
law of treaties which gave birth to the Communities, national law of the member 
states which delegate power to the Community institutions and resulting 
therefrom the autonomous legal order of the Community. Such configuration 
marks in the first place the impact on the national constitutions. 
This impact permeates the whole national legal system, both public and 
private. 
In order to establish the Community structure and to enable the institutions 
to function the member states had to delegate portions of their sovereignty for 
that purpose. Countries whose constitutions do not have the necessary 
mechanism (i.e. countries which subscribe to the du'al concept of law) have 
to change their constitutions or pass special enabling laws in order to undertake 
the duties inherent in the membership of the Community and to curtail their 
freedoms of action in specified areas in favour of the institutions. 
However once delegated the power cannot be withdrawn (Case 24 / 83: 
Gewiese v Mackenzie (1984) ECR 874) or, as stated by the Community Court, 
where the Community has acted within its competence the member states must 
refrain from taking concurrent action (See for example Case 22 / 70: 
Commission v Council (1971) ECR 263, at 274). However, until the 
Community has claimed its competence by using it the member states are free 
to act as sovereign states for this is their residual right. Cases 3, 4, 6 / 76: 
Officier van]ustitie v Kramer (1976) ECR 1279). This is the doctrine of the 
"occupied field" which in a recent case (Case 60 / 86, Commission v United 
Kingdom ( 1988) 3CMLR 437) prevented Britain from enacting legislation 
which would extend the number of lighting devices compulsory for motor cars 
beyond the list comprised in a Community directive. Thus Community law 
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determines the extent of the legal integration and does not permit the member 
states to be out of step either by exceeding the limit or failing to reach it. 
By virtue of the Treaty and the Act of Accession new members negotiate 
a package deal the effect of which is that, after the transitional period, they 
are in the same legal position as the founding members. This is a mixture of 
constitutional and consequential law for the Treaties, like modern constitutions, 
reveal a political and an economic charter. In the first place new member states 
accept, immediately and without reservations, the political structure of the 
Community, i.e. its constitution enshrined in the founding Treaties. This 
enables them to participate in the Community institutions and play their part 
in the Community decision-making process, including the Community 
legislation. They also accept the international treaties which the Community 
has made with third countries and the arrangements with international 
organizations. The former limit their power to negotiate trade agreements in 
their own right and obliges them to adjust their existing treaties with such 
countries so as to make them compatible with their Community obligations. 
The latter may limit their participation in the international organizations in 
so far as the Community may take their place. 
The package deal imports volumes of Community legislation which take 
effect immediately unless delayed by transitory provisions. 
This part of the package can be described as the economic law of the 
Community i.e. rules, rooted in the founding Treaties, which govern the 
regulation of trade and the economic activities whether of public bodies or 
private corporations and individuals coming within the concept and scope of 
the common market. It also includes certain procedural rules such as the rules 
for the investigation of breaches of Community competition law and the rules 
for references to the European Community Court from the national jurisdiction 
and for the enforcement of the judgments of the Community Court as well 
as the decisions of the Commission entailing fines and penalties. 
Provisions have also to be made for the implementation of future 
Community legislation. There are two kinds of such legislation: regulations 
i.e. rules which have an immediate and unconditonal effect and directives which
do not have the same effect. Therefore regulations, in theory, do not require
any specific incorporation into the national system. However they may
necessitate the repeal or amendment of the national law and, therefore, the
legislature has to act accordingly. Even if they constitute a new body of law
it is expedient, at least for the sake of good order, to put them onto the statute
book according to the national procedure.
The efficacy of the regulations is well illustrated by a case involving the 
payment of a premium in respect of slaughtered dairy cows (Case 93 / 71: 
Leonesio v Italian Ministry of Agriculture (1972) ECR 287 at 295). In order 
to reduce the milk production and also phase out small dairy farmers the 
Community, by a regulation, provided for the payment of a premium to dairy 
farmers if they had their cows slaughtered. The premium was to be paid by 
the national authorities but Italy failed to implement the regulation and, 
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therefore, the authorities were unable to pay. However the Community Court 
held that the farmer who fulfilled the conditions of the regulation had a right 
against the state and this right did not depend upon the implementing national 
legislation. Therefore Italy was in default because she failed to meet her 
obligation. The inefficiency of the national apparatus provided no defence (Case 
39 I 72: Commission v Italy (1973) ECR 101). 
Directives are chiefly the instrument of the harmonization of national laws. 
They are like commands issued to the member states telling them to achieve 
a certain objective, e.g. to introduce Value Added Tax, but leaving them the 
choice of the method to achieve the prescribed result. Unlike regulations, 
directives have in principle no direct effect as far as the individuals are 
concerned. They impose obligations upon the member states to which they 
are addressed which must be discharged by proper legislation. Therefore mere 
administrative implementation, e.g. circulars, which can be changed at any 
time by the national bureaucracy will not suffice (Case 239 / 85: Commission 
v Italy, re toxic and dangerous waste (1988) ICMLR 248). Failure to implement 
constitutes a breach of the Treaty. 
Individual rights, on the other hand, are created only by those directives 
which expressly provide for such rights without further enactment like, e.g. 
the directives harmonising the nursing profession (See Case 29 / 84: 
Commission v Germany, re nursing directive (1986) 3CMLR 579). However 
even those directives which do not create subjective rights may provide a defence 
to prosecution under national law which is inconsistent with a directive (See 
Case 148 / 78: Pubblico Ministero v Ratti ( 1979) ECR 1629). It follows that 
member states cannot rely, as against individuals, on their own failure to 
implement a directive (See the judgement of the French Conseil d'Etat in 
Compagnie Alitalia ( 1990) ICM LR 248). 
The shock administered to the national legal system upon accession consists 
of an imposition of autonomous rules common to whole Community but alien 
and perhaps even difficult to understand because of their nature and origin. 
However not only the texts but also their interpretation in the form of the 
persuasive authority of the judgments of the Community Court in previous 
cases have to be taken on board as a new source of law available to the courts, 
the state authorities and private parties. 
Indeed the Court has proved to be the most effective agent of legal 
integration. Although it has no legislative function its judgments command 
not only universal respect but also a law-making effect. Its main impact lies 
in the sphere of" constitutional law" of the Community and the implementation 
of Community economic policies where the founding Treaties have been drafted 
in general terms only and where conflicts between the Community and the 
member states have to be solved. It has defined the Community as a "new 
legal order'' and elevated the Treaties founding the Communities to the status 
of basic law. It clarified the position of the Community in its external relations 
especially as regards the GATT, defined the parameters of Community 
competence to enter into international trade agreements (Opinion 1 / 79: Re 
Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber (1979) ECR 2871) and 
developed an effective system of judicial control of administrative and legislative 
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acts of the Community institutions. Whilst defining the relationship between 
the Community and the member states the Court defined the principles upon 
which this relationship is based and in this way filled the gaps in the founding 
Treaties. It also proved to be a champion of individual rights especially in the 
field of the movement of persons, social security and the exercise of the right 
of establishment of the professions and of the right to provide services in face 
of national restrictions. In these areas it insisted on a strict interpretation of 
duties of the member states and on the right of foreigners to be heard and to 
be treated on equal terms with their citizens. 
Impact Upon Substantive Law 
A glance at the EEC Treaty reveals the nature and scope of the economic 
law, i.e. of the rules which govern the Common Market and the various policies 
which affect not only the running of the national economy but also relations 
between private parties be they commercial corporations or private individuals. 
These include: Customs laws affecting trade within the Common Market and 
the world at large; immigration rules affected by the free movement of persons; 
social security; the right of establishment and profnsional qualifications of self­
employed persons; the provision of services and the movement of capital 
including its effect upon banking and insurance; agriculture; transport; 
competition; dumping of goods; state aids to industry; state commercial 
monopolies, taxation, intellectual property, corporations and labour relations, 
consumer protection, environment, to name the most important areas of the 
law affected by Community membership. The necessary adjustments and 
derogations during the transitional period will be negotiated and comprised 
in the Act of Accession which, judging by precedents, turns out to be a 
massive volume. 
Procedure and Criminal Law 
National procedural law is, in principle, left intact though provisions have 
to be made for the enforcement of Community rules of competition, references 
to Community Courts and the enforcement of the judgments of the Community 
Court and of the decisions of the Commission. And so is national criminal law, 
though it has to be borne in mind that criminal sanctions, especially those which 
are used to enforce trade and market regulations, must not contravene 
Community law (see e.g. Case Redmond v Pigs Marketing Board ... ). 
Relationship Between Community Law and National Law 
In theory Community law forms an integral part of the national system 
and has to be applied as such by the national authorities. In reality, however, 
it has to be applied as an autonomous system uniformly in the whole Community 
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not only to safeguard its integrity but also to ensure that its integrationist force 
is not spent in the vagaries of national practices. In this respect one has to bear 
in mind that the principal function of the Community Court is to "ensure that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed" (EEC 
art.164; Euratom art.136; Coal and Steel art.31). 
This means that the Court not only exercises a judicial control over the 
Community institutions and over the member states in conformity with the 
principl� of legality but also has a duty similar to that of the supreme court 
of a federation of supervising the administration of justice in the state members 
of the federation. However the Community is not yet a federation and the 
Community Court is not a federal court a with direct authority over the 
judiciaries of the member states. It has, though, an indirect authority inasmuch 
as the courts form part of the machinery of the state and the state is responsible 
for their behaviour within the sphere of its obligations towards the Community, 
the control of such obligations being within the power of the Community Court. 
(See Case 77 I 69: Commission v Belgium (1970) ECR 237). Another form 
of supervision is exercised through the machinery of reference for preliminary 
rulings which will be considered later. 
In the circumstances it fell to the Community Court to define the principles 
which govern the relationship between the Community law and national law. 
These principles, i.e. autonomy, direct applicability and supremacy of 
Community law, do not rest upon express provisions of the founding Treaties 
but, emanating from judicial logic, they provide a practical guide to the relations 
between the two systems. All three can be traced back to the Van Gend Case 
(Supra) where the Court had to explain the nature of the EEC Treaty and 
its effect upon the customs law of a member state. 
The principle of the autonomy of Community law means that it is quite 
independent of the legislation passed by the member states (Case 28 I 67: 
Molkerei Zentrale ( 1968) ECR 143) and has to be interpreted and applied 
uniformly throughout the Community. Since the Community and the member 
states perform different functions the efficacy of the Treaty would be impaired 
if, in the context of partial integration with national law, the specific tasks 
entrusted to the Community were not interpreted as totally independent. It 
means, in practical terms, that e.g. in the field of competition when the two 
systems overlap national authorities have to apply Community law to the extent 
to which it overlaps with national law but are free to apply national law in 
areas which are not covered by Community law (Case 14 I 68: Wilhelm (1969) 
ECR 1). In this way the integrity and the unity of Community law within the 
entire Community is safeguarded whilst anything outside its domain is left to 
a free disposition of the member state. 
An analysis of the Treaties and Community legislation reveals that certain 
provisions are self-executing, i.e. directly applicable, whereas others represent 
a programme or a policy which have to be transformed into particular rules 
of law. There is also the whole host of Community directives which have to 
be implemented. These are binding upon the state as they are addressed to 
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the state compelling the state to carry out its obligation in the field of legislation 
but they do not necessarily create rights before so implemented. By contrast 
directly applicable rules take force in the territory of the member states without 
further enactment and, in this respect, constitute directly enforceable 
Community rights which can be relied on by the citizen. To illustrate this 
concept: In the Van Gend Case (supra) the Community Court held that there 
was an unconditional obligation on the part of the member state to refrain 
from introducing new customs duties which, in turn, created a corresponding 
right in favour of the importer. In another case (57 I 65: Alfons Lutticke (1966) 
ECR 205) the Court ruled that a member state must not impose on the pr.oduct 
of another member state any internal tax in excess of the tax levied on similar 
domestic product. In yet another case (2 I 74: Reyners v Belgium (1974) ECR 
631) a Dutch national qualified as a lawyer in Belgium was held to have a right
to practise his profession in Belgium µotwithstanding the requirement that only
Belgium nationals could be admitted to legal practice. The principle was
reiterated in many cases and perhaps in the most striking manner in the second
Simmenthal case (106 I 77, (1978) ECR 629) where it was linked with the
principle of supremacy, the Community Court stating thc1.t a directly applicable
Community rule takes precedenc� over the national legislation whether
antecedent or subsequent to the relevant Treaty provision.
As can be seen the principle of direct applicability addressed legislators 
and judges is the criterion of individual rights rooted in Community law which 
the legislator ought to respect and the judge must uphold. Case law suggests 
that in order to be directly applicable the provision of Community law must 
impose on the member state a clear and precise obligation; it must be 
unconditional, i.e. not accompanied by any reservation and the application 
of the Community rule must not be conditional upon any subsequent legislation 
whether of the Community institutions or of the member states (Advocate­
General· Mauras in case 41 I 74: Van Duyn (1974) ECR 1337). 
As mentioned earlier the principle of supremacy of Community law is 
closely linked with the principle of direct applicability. It has been deduced 
by the Community Court not so much from the provisions of the founding 
Treaties as from the constitutions of the member states and the federal concept 
of the Community. It was first mentioned in the Van Gend case (supra) to 
solve the problem of a conflict between the Treaty and national customs law. 
It was firmly established in Costa v ENEL (Case 6 I 64 (1964) ECR 585) a 
case concerning inter alia the question whether Italian law nationalizing the 
electricity industry was compatible with the EEC Treaty. The Community 
Court held that the Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry 
into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
member states and w}:iich their courts were bound to apply. Because of its special 
and original nature it could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions, 
however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law 
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. 
Commenting specifically on the impact of �he Community upon national 
legislation the Court said that '' the transfer by the states from their domestic 
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legal system to the Community legal system of rights and obligations arising 
under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, 
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the 
Community cannot prevail''. Addressing itself to the national judicature the 
Community Court ruled in the Simmenthal case cited above that '' a national 
court which is called upon to apply provisions of Community law is under a 
duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion 
to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation and it is not necessary 
for the court to request or await a prior setting aside of such provision by 
legislative act or other constitutional means''. This should not be read as an 
attempt to incite the national judiciary to rebellion but to re'"state the principle 
of state duty under the Treaties to adjust it machinery, both legislative and 
judicial, to the obligations arising from the membership of the Community 
and to remind of the federal concept of the Community. Indeed, if national 
legislature could override Community law or if national courts could disregard 
Community law when in conflict with their own, this would be the end of the 
Community as a supra national organization. It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that Community law should prevail even if "it is alleged that the 
basic rights guaranteed by the national constitution were violated" (Case 
11 I 70: Internationale Handelgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125). This statement, 
in a case involving a spurious claim that an agricultural regulation had violated 
the principles of the Grundgesetz, had initially upset the Germans but now 
(Re the Application of Wiinsche Handelgesellschaft (1987) 3CMLR 225) they 
admit that even in that area references to the Community Court are acceptable. 
Though the Community Court has no power to strike down national 
legislation it can achieve practically the same result through the principle of 
supremacy by declaring such legislation "incompatible with the Treaty". The 
message in such a case is for the state concerned to amend its laws under the 
pain of prosecution by the Commission for a breach of the Treaty. 
Cases involving between Community law and national law come often 
before the Community Court by virtue of the procedure for a preliminary ruling 
(EEC art.177; Euratom art.150; Coal and Steel art.41) which constitutes a 
bridge between the Community and the national jurisdictions. This enables 
the national courts to refer for interpretation points of law arising in the course 
of application by them of the Community Treaties, the Community legislation 
and of the acts of bodies established by the Council. It should be borne in mind 
that this procedure does not establish a right of recourse to the Community 
Court but a machinery available to national courts whereby they obtain an 
authoritative interpretation of points of law essential for their decision. Thus 
the roles of the two jurisdictions are divided: the national court poses the 
questions which the Community Court answers and then the national court 
decides the case on the basis of the answers received. Although the procedure 
for the reference is governed by national rules the power to refer has been given 
to the national judge by the Treaty directly and this power must not be curtailed 
or inhibited by national procedures (Rhein-Miihlen Cases (1974) ECR 33 and 
(1974) ECR 139). 
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According to the Community Court procedure every reference is notified 
to all the member states and to the Commission as well as the Council if the 
act which is to be interpreted has emanated from the Council. In this way the 
matter· ceases to be of sole concern to the parties to the dispute and the 
adjudicating court; it thus becomes of common concern to the member states 
and the Community institutions which may intervene in the proceedings. As 
a result the referring court, the institutions and the authorities of the member 
states obtain the benefit of an authoritative interpretation of the point involved 
whilst the Commuity system becomes enriched by a judgment which commands 
a universal attention and contributes to a uniform understaning and application 
of Community law. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The law is not the sole prerogative of lawyers but as a profession they 
are primarily affected by the imposition of Community law upon the nati�nal 
system. They have to learn new rules and acquire new skills. They have to 
grapple with new and alien ideas, principles and terminology often inadequately 
rendered by translation. On Malta's accession Maltese will become one of the 
official languages of the Community and Maltese lawyers will be called upon 
to play their part. 
Government lawyers will be responsible together with the Community 
bureaucrats for the drafting of the Community legislation. They will have to 
learn new skills and the art of working together with Community lawyers. They 
also will advise their Government on the application of Community rules and 
defend the Government position before the Commission and the Community 
Court. 
Lawyers in commerce and industry will have to be able to advise their 
clients on a variety of subjects within the whole area of the law of the economy 
as outlined above and how to obtain grants for industry and development. 
Lawyers in private practice will have to be able to advise their clients not 
only on the relevant aspects of the Community law but also on its effect on 
the national system in various areas, including criminal law. They ought to 
gain expertise in "Euro-defences" before the national courts and in the drafting 
of references to the Community Court. They must also learn how to conduct 
cases before the Commission and the Community Court. 
Judges too must become familiar with the substance and procedural 
Community law, the distinction between the directly and indirectly applicable 
Community rules and the techniques of the reference for preliminary ruling. 
Their authority will not be diminished but the variety of their work will increase. 
However there is nothing to be afraid of. An island country which, like 
a rock in the sea, has survived centuries of foreign domination including the 
British rule, is well equipped to undertake the obligations arising from the 
membership of the Community and to play a positive role in the construction 
of Europe. 
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